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Abstract
In this paper, a novel approach to behavioural
modelling is presented with reference to
biological infection spread in communities. Its
potential application to various terrorist-related
scenarios is discussed in relation to attack
point simulation and interdiction simulation.

1. Introduction & Background
Terrorist attacks can take many different forms
using a wide range of weapon types or tactics
and this poses some considerable problems in
defining both the risks that arise in modern
urban environments as well as optimising
interdiction and response strategies. Critical
infrastructure is dispersed and provides
multiple vulnerabilities and opportunities for
attack. As attacks both in London and, more
recently, in Mumbai have shown, modern
terrorism should be thought of as requiring a
3D spatial vulnerability approach to counter
terrorism. [Flaherty, 2008]. While both game
theory and queuing theory have been used for
assessing terrorism events we present an
alternative approach to this problem which
overcomes their fundamental problem, that of
estimating the number that get through to
attack.
Microsimulation is a discrete simulation
technique which allows for the modelling of
the behaviour of single individuals in a
complex system [Connor et al, 2000; Mertz,
1991]. It was originally devised for financial
and economic modelling [Weinstein, 2006;
Orcutt, 1957], but is generally applicable to a
wide range of scenarios.
In the current research project, we have created
a modular, scalable microsimulation package,
called Simulacron, which allows for the rapid
creation of microsimulations involving large

numbers of people interacting with each other
and their environment.
The framework is designed around a
master/slave architecture, in which the
processing of the simulation can be arbitrarily
divided among one or more worker (slave)
processes under the supervision of the master
process. Each of these processes may operate
in a loosely-coupled environment such as that
provided by a cluster or network of machines.
This architecture allows for the development of
models of far greater size and complexity than
could reasonably be supported by a monolithic,
single-process design.
The only requirement the framework imposes
upon the model is that it must be expressible
using a combination of distinct locations and
individuals. All interactions and behaviours of
these are specified by the simulation model
itself.
Due to its modular nature, the
framework places no requirements for any
particular state information for locations or
individuals; their state may be arbitrarily
extended by each module to allow for
composition of model components into
arbitrarily complex simulations.
In addition to this simulation framework, we
have also developed a number of support tools
including a prototype non-linear visualisation
package which allows for the creation of
complex visualisations by non-programming
personnel.
Models are specified using a template
language, based on XML, which permits the
creation of very large data sets via the
instantiation of relatively simple macro
templates.
For example, this allows the
specification of a single template for a
statistically average individual which can then

be instantiated an arbitrary number of times to
create a background population into which
unique individuals may be “injected” to
simulate specific behaviours. XML is also
currently used for the output of all data,
although work is underway to transition to a
more
compact
and
easily
managed
representation.
The initial study undertaken was the simulation
of an influenza epidemic [Grist, 1979] at the
Royal Naval School (RNS) in Greenwich,
London in 1920. It was of particular interest
due to the relatively complete information
available regarding the outbreak, including the
progress of the disease over time and its
infection mechanism [Dudley, 1926] as well as
the behaviour of the population in its “normal”
state [NMM, 2007]. This scenario was also
attractive in that it occurred in an essentially
closed community for which we have detailed
historical documentation [Bold, 2000].
The model of the RNS outbreak involved the
creation of nine dormitories, nine reading
rooms, around 40 classrooms and roughly 15
other locations including the hospital. Student
behaviours were established in seasonal class
groups involving a total of 951 students. In
addition, the behaviours of 27 staff were also
modelled. Each of these individuals is assigned
a unique set of infectious parameters based on
statistical distributions shared between all the
participants. When the simulation starts, each
person is sent to their appropriate location
based on their schedule. The movements and
interactions, including cross infection, of the
individuals is then modelled over time by
Simulacron.
Behaviours are a mixture of constrained
(students must follow their timetables, sleep in
assigned dormitories, etc.) and unconstrained
(students move about freely at playtime). As
stated previously, the modular nature of the
framework allows us to use whatever
behaviours are most appropriate for the model
at hand.
The underlying infection model used in the
simulation is conceptually a combination of the
“Susceptible,
Infective,
Recovered,
Susceptible” and “Susceptible, Exposed,
Infective, Recovered” models (commonly
known as SIRS and SEIR respectively)
[Kermack and McKendrick,1927; Daley and
Gani,1999]. In addition to the standard states,
we added two mechanisms to the model. The

first, “hero” time, allows the simulation of the
“I’m too busy to get sick,” or “It’s just a little
cold,” phenomenon. The second, isolation,
allows for individuals to be removed from the
cross-infection domain once disease is
detected. The isolation mechanic can be
conditionally applied only during particular
hours of the day.
The parameters are
effectively selected by a convergence
methodology against the historical data. While
the full procedure is still being developed, the
results in the case study presented agree
reasonably well with other influenza studies.
[Halloran 2001]

2. Preliminary Results
The original 1920 outbreak lasted for roughly
25 days. Each simulation was run over 30
virtual days with a time step of five minutes
and output every hour. The output represents a
snapshot of the entire population, recording the
location and infection state for each individual.
For infected individuals it also records the
source of the infection, and when they became
infected. This data allows comparison with the
historical number of new cases every day.
Systematic changes to the model parameters in
successive simulations allowed investigation of
the sensitivity of parameters against the
historical data. Furthermore, by varying only
the initial random seed, different instances of
the same underlying process can be modelled,
allowing the determination of statistical
parameters, such as mean and standard
deviation for such properties as number of
deaths.
Our technique also allows us the investigation
of additional properties of the infection process
which would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to evaluate with traditional
statistical modelling. Chief among these is the
ability provided to determine “infection
chains”, a chronological sequence of who
infected who, where and when.
The results, even allowing for the relative
simplicity of the model and the inevitable
inexactitude of the parameter estimates,
showed remarkably close agreement with the
historical data, as seen in Figure 1 below,
capturing the development, peak and recovery
times with surprising accuracy. Contrast this
with the result of the more traditional purely
statistical model shown in Figure 2.
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It could be argued that the statistical model is,
in a sense, more accurate than the simulation
results as it provides a precise match for the
total number of cases.
However, the
simulation method clearly provides a much
more realistic, if less “exact”, result.
An unexpected outcome was the presence,
among the simulation series, of runs in which,
despite all parameters being the same, no
epidemic occurred. This suggests that further
investigation may be required into the
“known” causes of epidemic spread

3. Adapting the Model to Terrorist
Scenarios
The studies we are currently conducting are
more directly of interest to the present
audience as they include models related to

terrorist activity.
describe below.

Two of these we briefly

In support of this, a more comprehensive
model has been developed involving 14402
individuals, grouped into families, whose
overall properties match the statistical census
data for Australia, interacting in an
environment of 6935 locations including 6000
homes, and 935 workplaces, schools,
recreational areas, hospitals, etc. The people
move within the community according to
schedules that emulate employed, part-time
employed, unemployed and home workers,
primary and secondary school children and
infants that again match statistical data for
Australian communities.

3.1. Attack Point Simulation – the
“living bomb”
The first proposed model addresses the
question “What happens if we vary the point of
release chosen by a terrorist conducting a
biological attack?”
The required model behaviour for this scenario
can be achieved, without change to the
previously described infection model, by the
injection of a “living bomb” represented as a
single individual who remains stationary for
the duration of the simulation and can become
highly infectious at a predetermined moment in
time.
Four locations in a virtual community were
used as a preliminary assessment of the impact
of location on release from a “living bomb”.
The four locations were a cinema complex, a
club, a large store, and the community
hospital.
The infection that was used in the simulation
was based on smallpox with typical time
parameters given by CDC information [CDC,
2004]. The probability of infection for each
individual was the reproduction rate for an
infected person adjusted for the timestep used
in the simulation. The initial release emulated
a badly constructed device with limited ability
to spread infection.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of
people who visited the four locations. Only
two of the simulations resulted in infection

spread, the club and the cinema complex with
one infection each over the release time. The
infection occurred about 10 hours after the
release. The pathogen in the absence of the
human host was assumed to be viable for
approximately 24 hours. The time of first
infection is shown in Figure 3. It suggests that
in any release there is a threshold of exposure
required to spread infection; this can be the
number of people or the time exposed. The
store and the hospital did not have enough
people moving through the building to ensure
that someone contracted the disease.
In the two cases of disease spread, the spread
of disease continued to spread through the
community. The first appearance of symptoms
occurred 14 days after exposure in the cinema
and 18 days from the club. By 80 days, 2560
and 2016 people were infected from the
cinema and club exposures respectively. With
this particular disease, the relatively long
incubation period does allow time for
intervention, isolation and ring vaccination so
long as surveillance systems for the disease
identify a case quickly. The second infected
person
in
each
simulation
become
symptomatic 26 and 31 days after the primary
exposure by which time there were 4 and 5
additional infecteds.
These early results suggest that the location of
release will be extremely important to the
number of subsequent cases of infection that
occur. While more studies are required to
elucidate the sensitivity to population moving
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through a target and dispersal effectiveness at
the point of delivery, the result does have
implications for assessment of risk, the
provision of resources for dealing with an
outbreak and the effectiveness of possible
control mechanisms.

3.2. Interdiction Simulation
The second proposed model addresses the
question “How effective is a specific
interdiction regime?”
This required the development of a new
simulation module to be integrated with the
existing components. This new module, the
“TPC” system, allows the modelling of three
distinct groups with differing behaviours as
follows:
Terrorists (the “T” group) are individuals who
move through the environment until, at a
predetermined moment in time, they attack,
causing the “deaths” of any individuals sharing
their location. Each terrorist has, in addition to
standard model parameters, a “camouflage
factor”, Fc, which determines how effective
they are at concealing themselves from law
enforcement.
Police (the “P” group) are individuals who
move through the environment attempting to
detect terrorist presence. If a police officer
detects a terrorist then that terrorist is “killed”
(removed from the simulation). Each police
officer has, in addition to standard model
parameters, a “perception factor”, Fp, which
determines how effective they are at spotting
the bad guys.
Citizens (the “C” group) are the remaining
individuals in the environment. They do not
participate in the simulation except in the sense
that they could be killed at any moment.
Detection is deemed to have occurred if, in any
simulated period of time in which a terrorist
and a police officer are collocated, a randomly
determined value falls below the detection
threshold defined as the interception factor =
Fp ( 1 – Fc ).
This basic model may be varied by changing
properties in a logical manner. For example,
Run
Ca mouflage Factor
Perception Factor
Pre-emptive factor
Interception factor

0
0.8
0.8
0.5
0.16

1
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.12

2
0.8
0.5
0.5
0.1

replacing the instantaneous lethality of the
terrorist attack with a probabilistic one (a
smaller bomb) or replacing it with a
conventional infective state simulating the
release of a biological agent.
Because of the flexibility of the program,
police behaviours may range from completely
random to precisely specified, the latter
allowing the investigation and validation of
predetermined interdiction strategies such as
those derived from game-theoretic modelling
[Pita et al, 2008].
The community used in the above “living
bomb” scenario was used with the club as a
target location for a terrorist attack. The
terrorist was embedded in the community
undertaking normal activities arriving at the
point of explosion just before the time the
explosion is due. Police also moving about the
community are attempting to stop the attack.
In the nine scenarios tested the three factors
that are used in the simulation are shown in
Table 1. There was one terrorist and ten police
in these simulations.
Figures 4 and 5 show the results of the
simulation; Figure 4 shows how the
interception factor influences the date and time
of interdiction or attack while Figure 5 shows
the location and the number of dead or injured
as a function of that date and time. The only
simulation to get to the target time of 03 Jun
21:23 was run 8. Pre-emptive detonation only
occurred in run 0. The other 6 simulations
resulted in successful arrest. The decline of
the interception factor (Figure 4) follows the
transition from early to later times in
interception, eventually resulting in no
interdiction and the terrorist reaching the target
at the designated time.
A second series of five simulations were
undertaken to show the effect of reducing the
number of Police available for hunting and
stopping the terrorist using the interdiction
factors for run 0 in Table 1. The results show
that even though the model parameters are
high compared with that required to get to the
target at the target time when there are 10
police, reducing the numbers of police can also
result in reaching the target at the designated
time.
3
0.8
0.4
0.5
0.08

4
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.04

Table 1: Interdiction Factors

5
0.8
0.1
0.5
0.02

6
0.9
0.1
0.5
0.01

7
0.95
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0.005

8
0.99
0.1
0.5
0.001
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0.16
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These two examples of simulation show the
potential power in this type of modelling as it
can not only look at coordinated attacks but
also the requirements for resources, the levels
of perception or intelligence assistance and the
tactics that are needed to optimise these
resources if these types of activities are to be
prevented.

4. Discussion and Future
Our method differs significantly from other
methods for assessing interdiction strategies

[Atkinson and Wein 2008; Hazen et al, 2003]
as it is time rather than event driven and based
on the detailed modelling of individual
behaviour within population groups rather than
more abstract constructs.
Because of this, we can “inject” deterministic
behaviour patterns for specific individuals into
a background population modelled with
randomly varying properties.
The advantage as we see it over existing
techniques is that it can produce in simulations
both the successes and failures together with
full information about the paths to success or

failure. The biological model is not a standard
compartmental SEIRS type model and is more
readily suited to backcasting and forecasting
methods required for decision support in live
situations. Furthermore, because it simulates
actions of the individual it can test alternative
policies and social controls that are difficult if
not impossible to test without making some
gross assumptions. Because of these attributes
it can be used to test assumptions being made
in other techniques which are not testable.
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